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A

fter the adoption of the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution by
the Congress of the United States in August, 1964,1 there was a substantial
increase in the American military presence in South Vietnam and consequent
and parallel increases in the range and extent of belligerent activities. In
accordance with its customary practice, the International Committee of the Red
Cross2 (hereinafter referred to as the ICRC) thereupon addressed a letter to the
several parties to the conflict,3 pointing out that they had all ratified or adhered
to, and were bound by, the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of
Victims ofWar. 4 The ICRC reminded the parties of their specific obligations
under the Conventions, 5 and requested information as to the measures being
taken by each of them to conform to the duties devolving upon them.
Replies were received from all of the parties concerned. The United States
advised that it "has always abided by the humanitarian principles enunciated in
the Geneva conventions and will continue to do so." Spe~ifically, it affirmed
that it was "applying the provisions of the Geneva Conventions [in Vietnam]
and we expect the other parties to the conflict to do likewise.,,6 The Republic
of Vietnam (hereinafter referred to as South Vietnam) assured the ICRC that it
was "fully prepared to respect the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and
to contribute actively to the efforts of the International Committee of the Red
Cross to ensure their application.,,7
The reply received from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (hereinafter
referred to as North Vietnam) was the usual propaganda tirade which appears
to be endemic in Communist documents, thus making it rather difficult to isolate
any truly responsive portions. However, the letter did state that North Vietnam
would "regard the pilots who have carried out pirate-raids, destroying the
property and massacring the population of the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam, as major [war] criminals caught in flagrante delicto and liable for
judgment in accordance with the laws of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,
although captured pilots are well treated."S The National Liberation Front
(hereinafter referred to as the NLF) , the political arm of the Vietcong, flatly
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refused to apply the Conventions, stating that it "was not bound by the
international treaties to which others beside itself subscribed.... [T]he NLF,
however, affinned that the prisoners it held were humanely treated and that,
above all, enemy wounded were collected and cared for.,,9
This article has well-defined limitations in scope. It will be concerned solely
with some of the instances of maltreatment of prisoners of war which constitute
violations of several of the more important humanitarian provisions of the 1949
Geneva Prisoner-of-W ar Convention, or of customary international law, which
appear to have occurred during the course of the fighting in Vietnam. 10
Unfortunately, the positions taken by North Vietnam and the NLF necessitate
at least some discussion of the problems created by their attitude toward
compliance with the humanitarian aspects of the law of war and by the question
of the applicability of the Convention under the circumstances which exist in
Vietnam.

I. Past Communist Practice With Respect to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War

y

Inasmuch as the lon list of States which have ratified or adhered to the 1949
1
Geneva Conventions contains all of the Communist countries, including the
major sponsors of North Vietnam and the NLF, viz the USSR and the People's
Republic of China, it is obvious that the refusal of North Vietnam and the NLF
to consider themselves bound by even the limited humanitarian provisions
enumerated in Article 3 of the Convention12 cannot be because these provisions
are in any manner contrary to the Communist concept of the law of war. 13 The
only alternative is to assume that they consider that it is in their own self-interest
not to be under any of the constraints imposed by a requirement to comply with
these purely humanitarian aspects of the law of war. However, one engaged in
armed hostilities, even as a rebel in a civil war, cannot thus divest himself of the
requirement to comply with those portions of the law of war which constitute
a part of the customary rules of international law recognized by all civilized
nations-and, as we shall shortly see in more detail, the provisions of Article 3
of the Convention, for the most part, fall within this category.14

A. The USSR during World War II
During World War II, the USSR acknowledged that it was bound by the
1907 Hague Regulations 15 and the 1929 Geneva Wounded-and-Sick
Convention, 16 and took the position that the provisions ofthese two agreements
covered "all the main questions of captivity." 17 Based upon this statement the
ICRC assumed that there would be, among other things, exchanges of lists of
prisoners of war and of mail and relief packages, and that its delegates would be
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pennitted and enabled to enter Russia and to inspect prisoner-of-war camps
located in that country. This was also the assumption of the enemies of the
USSR. Despite continuous efforts on the part of the ICRC, however, none of
1S
these things ever eventuated. One author ascribed this negative policy adopted
by the USSR to the alleged "official Soviet position, that any soldier who fell
into enemy hands was ipso facto a traitor and deserved no protection from his
19
govemment. "

B. North Korea
During the Korean hostilities the North Korean Government announced that
its forces were "strictly abiding by principles of Geneva Conventions in respect
to Prisoners of War,,;20 and in the lengthy dispute during the annistice
negotiations regarding "forced repatriation" of prisoners of war, the North
Korean and Chinese Communists relied very heavily on certain articles of the
1949 Convention.21 Despite this, only two lists of American prisoners of war,
totalling just 110 names, were ever sent to the Central Tracing Agency of the
I CRC in Geneva (in August and September 1950, shortly after hostilities began),
death marches occurred, prisoners of war were inadequately fed, and mail was
allowed only on an irregular basis (usually to serve some propaganda purpose).
Repeated efforts, which continued even during the course of the annistice
negotiations, were unsuccessful in obtaining pennission for the ICRC to send
22
a delegate into North Korea to inspect the prisonerof-war camps located there.

C. North Vietnam
Now, in Vietnam, we have a third instance of a Communist regime (North
Vietnam) which has agreed to be bound by a humanitarian war convention but
which, when the conditions arise under which the convention is to be applied,
declines to comply with its provisions. North Vietnam persists in refusing to
provide the names of persons held as prisoners of war, refusing to pennit
correspondence between the prisoners of war and their families, and refusing to
pennit the neutral ICRC delegates to inspect the prisoner-of-war camps so as
to be able to detennine whether the prisoners of war are, in fact, receiving the
humane treatment to which they are entitled and which that regime long ago
committed itself to provide. Similarly, the NLF refuses to consider itselfbound
in any way, even by the limited provisions of Article 3 of the Convention?3
It would seem, at this point, to be fairly well established that the Communist
countries, while ready to become parties to humanitarian war conventions, are
not ready to comply with their provisions, for they are either not concerned
about obtaining reciprocal treatment for their captured personnel, or, possibly,
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they may assume that by their present method they will still obtain humane
treatment for Communist personnel without any need to reciprocate-which
is what has actually occurred in both Korea and Vietnam. Unfortunately, the
result of this procedure can only be that eventually the other side in international
armed conflicts, and the established government in civil armed conflicts, will
refuse to apply the Convention until confirmation of the fact that it is being
applied by the Communist side. 24 Although this procedure certainly would leave
much to be desired from the immediate humanitarian point of view, it might,
in the long run, prove to be more humanitarian to the greater number ofpersons.
Of course, the argument would undoubtedly be made, in opposition to such a
procedure, that the obligation to comply with the Convention does not depend
upon reciprocity, but upon the undertaking made to all the other parties thereto,
and also that the Convention creates individual rights which may not be
withdrawn because of the failure of one side to comply.25 While this may well
be true, it is unquestionably going to be increasingly difficult to persuade a
country engaged in armed conflict with a Communist country, or an established
government engaged in civil strife with a Communist uprising, that it must give
Communist prisoners of war the benefits of the Convention while its own
captured personnel do not even receive the minimum benefits of customary
international law. They will undoubtedly tend to take the position that there
must be a point at which the refusal of the Communist side to comply with the
provisions of the Convention releases the other side from its obligations
26
thereunder.
II. Does Article 2 of the 1949 Convention Apply in Vietnam?

Whether the fighting which is taking place in Vietnam constitutes an
international armed conflict or a civil war has been the subject of considerable
dispute. It is the official position of the United States that what is taking place
in Vietnam is an international armed conflict?7 This position has received
28
support from unofficial sources. Opponents of United States participation in
the Vietnamese hostilities assert that it is a civil war?9 Before proceeding to a
discussion of specific instances of the improper treatment of prisoners of war,
let us examine the law applicable under the various possibilities.
The first paragraph of Article 2 of the 1949 Convention provides that:
[T]he present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. (Emphasis added).
The meaning of the quoted provisions is clear; and at no time since the drafting
of the Convention in 1949 has any state indicated the existence of any question
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with respect to that meaning. In fact, it is among those provisions of the
Convention which have been given both uniform interpretation and general
30
approval.
The only specific legal excuse ever advanced by North Vietnam for its
insistence that the Convention is not applicable, and that persons captured by it
are not entided to the humanitarian protections afforded by the Convention,
has been that there is no "declared war.,,31 It is surely beyond dispute that there
is an "armed conflict" in Vietnam between two or more of the parties to the
Convention. Under these circumstances, the fact that there has been no
declaration of war, or that a state of war is not recognized as existing, is
completely irrelevant to the requirement to apply the Convention. There is,
then, no validity whatsoever to the sole legal reason put forward by North
Vietnam to justify its refusal to apply the Convention by which it voluntarily
elected to be bound a number of years before the armed conflict in Vietnam
reached its present status.32 The wording used in drafting the first paragraph of
Article 2 leaves no doubt that it was the intent of the Diplomatic Conference
which approved it that the Convention be applicable in every instance of the
use of armed force in international relations-and, beyond any shadow of doubt,
this intent was attained. It appears equally clear that the refusal of North Vietnam
to apply the Convention under the circumstances which exist in
Vietnam-whether or not the United States is "waging a war of
aggression,,33-constitutes a blatant disregard of an international obligation,
freely accepted.

III. Does Article 3 of the Convention Apply in Vietnam?

. 34.IS sometimes
.
I:
d to as a " convention
. .10
. Ie 3 0 f th e C onvention
relerre
Artic
miniature,,,35 or as a "mini-convention.,,36 The draftsmen attempted to include
in a single article those basic humanitarian provisions which render
prisoner-of-war status somewhat less horrendous than it inherendy is-thus, in
a relatively simple manner, calling to the attention of the participants in a
non-international armed conflict the s~ecific humanitarian rules which control
their actions from the very outset. 7 Unfortunately, even this minunum
38
approach has frequendy proven unsuccessful.
The idea of including in an international convention a provision regulating
civil wars was extremely nove1. 39 While the ICRC had been aiming for such
an extension of the Geneva-type Conventions for many years, it was not
successful in this respect until the 1949 Diplomatic Conference. 40 The main
objection voiced during the discussions in committee and in the plenary sessions
of the Diplomatic Conference was that under a number of the proposals the
established government would seemingly be required to apply the Convention
even in cases ofbrigandage. 41 The other problem that had to be solved was the
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detennination as to which provisions ofthe Convention should in an appropriate
42
case be applied. The compromise ultimately adopted left the term "armed
conflict not of an international character" undefined-which; in effect, was a
detennination to make the term as broad and all-encompassing as possible. On
the other hand, the minimum provisions which the parties to the armed conflict
are obligated to apply are enumerated at length, rather than providing for the
application of the entire Convention (as the working draft had done) or of all
provisions falling within certain broad categories (as the USSR had proposed). 43
What is the effect of Article 3 of the Convention on the parties to an "armed
conflict not of an international character?" As far as the established government
is concerned, if it is a party to the Convention it is bound by the provisions of
Article 3 just as much as it would be bound by all of the provisions of the
Convention in an armed conflict of an international character. 44 And the same
is true of third states which intervene to support either side in a civil war. 45
The foregoing has caused comparatively few legal problems. 46 Where
problems arise, however, is with respect to the obligation of the insurgents.
How, it will be asked, can the action of the established government in becoming
a party to the Convention, an action perhaps taken many years before the
rebellion was even contemplated, now be held to bind the insurgents ?47 This
48
is the position taken by the NLF. While it may have some minimum legal
basis-this is the most that can be said for it-there are a number of valid legal
theories under which a finding that the insurgents are bound by the provisions
of Article 3 can be fully justified. 49
While Soviet legal writers do not specifically state that insurgents50 are bound
by the provisions of Article 3, that is certainly the only logical conclusion which
can be drawn from their writings. Thus, their widely distributed textbook states:
[T]he Soviet delegation secured the [1949 Diplomatic] Conference's recognition
of a number of important humane clauses which were included in the new
Conventions. For example, the obligatory character of the application during
armed conflicts which are not of an international character of such principles as
the humane treatment of persons not taking a direct part in military operations or
who have ceased to take part in these operations as a result of sickness, illness or
. . was recogruze
. d ....51
CaptIVIty,

It has been said that the established government cannot be prejudiced by
applying Article 3, "for no Government can possibly claim that it is entitled to
make use of torture and other inhuman acts prohibited by the Convention as a
· ·Its enermes.
. ,,52 It wo uld certal'nly seem th at this argument
means 0 f comb atmg
is equally applicable to the insurgent party, for how can armed conflict be
conducted with different rules controlling the actions of the two contending
'd ..,53
SI es r
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Finally, there is much merit in a further statement made in the official ICRC
interpretation of Article 3 of the Convention to the effect that:
If an insurgent party applies Article 3, so much the better for the victims of the
conflict. No one will complain. Ifit does not apply it, it will prove that those who
regard its actions as mere acts of anarchy or brigandage are right ....54

Certainly, any insurgent force or alleged "national liberation movement" which
does not comply with the provisions of Article 3 requiring humane treatment,
and prohibiting violence, murder, torture and maltreatment of prisoners of war
falls within the category of brigands and terrorists.
What if, despite the foregoing, insurgents take the position that they are not
bound by the provisions of Article 3, and this position gains acceptance? Except
for the rare case such as Algeria, where the insurgents themselves sought
application of the Convention, 55 Article 3 will become a dead letter. Unusual,
indeed, would be the government willing to grant captured insurgents the
benefits flowing from Article 3 while knowing that its own personnel, when
captured, are tortured, otherwise maltreated and slaughtered. Although the
requirement for granting these benefits to captured insurgents is stated to be
absolute, and not to be dependent upon reciprocity,56 once again it will be
extremely difficult to convince any governtnent and its people that such a
unilateral compliance should be expected of them.
We may then be in a position in which there is no applicable international
legislation governing the actions of the insurgents and we would, therefore, have
need to resort to the customary law of war. What are the customary rules
accepted by the civilized nations of the world? Are they binding upon insurgents?
IV. The Pertinent Customary Law of War

In the opinion rendered by the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal
(hereinafter referred to as IMT), which all Communist nations seemingly regard
as a revelation second only to those of Marx, Engels and Lenin (and, it is to be
assumed, of Mao in China), it is stated that by 1939 the 1907 Hague
Regulations57 were "declaratory of the laws and customs of war. ,,58 It is also
there confirmed that an individual is not held as a prisoner of war for purposes
of revenge or punishment, but merely to prevent him from further participation
in the conflict and that he is, therefore, a helpless person whom it is contrary to
military tradition to kill or injure. 59 One of the subsequent Nuremberg Military
Tribunals, in deciding The High Command Case} 60 correcdy construed the IMT
opinion as holding that by 1939 both the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1929
61
Geneva Prisoner-of-War Convention "were binding insofar as they were in
substance an expression of international law as accepted by the civilized nations
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of the world. ,,62 Every military force engaged in anned conflict, whether or not
international in character, and whether representing an old or a new state, an
established government or an insurgent party, is bound to comply with these
established rules of the "civilized nations of the world." Failure to do so places
that military force, and the political organization which it represents and from
which it takes its orders and policies, in direct violation of the foregoing
· · 1es enunCIate
. d at N uremb erg. 63
pnncip
The Tribunal in The High Commatld Case did not limit itself to the general
statement that the 1907 Hague Regulations and the 1929 Geneva
Prisoner-of-War Convention now represented customary law. Inasmuch as
there were obviously provision in those two Conventions dealing with details
which could not be construed as customary law, the Tribunal assumed the task
of designating exactly which provisions of the two agreements did fall within
that category. It proceeded to review the specific provisions of each of the two
Conventions and found that those provisions requiring humane treatment of
prisoners of war, and those protecting them from acts of violence, insults, public
curiosity, corporal punishment and acts of cruelty, were "an expression of the
.
,,64
·
accepted VIews
0 f Cl·vili·ze d natIOns.
Of course, the Tribunal in The High Command Case was concerned only with
those aspects of the law accepted by civilized nations of the world under which
violations had been proven in the case before it. Its list is not, therefore,
all-inclusive. Some writers have extended it to include the four groupings listed
in Article 3 of the Convention,65 probably on the extremell plausible theory
that in rejecting both the ICRC and USSR proposals6 the Diplomatic
Conference had selected for inclusion in Article 3 (to be binding on both sides
in a civil war) only those humanitarian principles which alreacr had received
6
demonstrable acceptance by the civilized nations of the world. It also appears
that both the Tribunals and the writers have definite ideas with respect to the
imposition upon prisoners of war of vicarious punishment in the fonn of
. als .68
repns
Do these customary rules of warfare apply to insurgents? There seems little
doubt that they do, even though the rules have so frequently been honored only
in the breach. The Soviet textbook states that "the laws and customs of war
apply not only to armies in the strict sense of the word, but also to levies,
voluntary detachments, organised resistance movements and partisans. ,,69 Under
existing circumstances, where every insurgent movement other than one which
is avowedly anti-Communist immediately becomes a "national liberation
movement" enjoying full Communist support, further citation of authority
would appear to be redundant.
From the foregoing, it may be properly concluded that apart from any
international legislation represented by the Hague or Geneva or other
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Conventions, minimum customary law requires that prisoners of war be treated
humanely; forbids the use against them ofall forms ofviolence including corporal
punishment, torture, cruelty and killing; and protects them from insults and
public curiosity. With this in mind, we may now proceed to an examination of
the incidents reported to have occurred or to have been threatened in Vietnam,
applying the provisions of the Convention generally, those of Article 3, or
.
. allaw were
h
. 70
customary mtematlon
appropnate.
V. Charges Made Against the United States

It has already been pointed out that the United States responded'prompdy to
the ICRC letter concerning the application of the Geneva Conventions in
Vietnam and committed itself to apply the 1949 Convention.71 This
commitment was thereafter adopted by the various nations which have furnished
military forces to sup~ort South Vietnam and it has been reiterated on several
appropriate occasions. 2 Although, strangely enough, no report has been found
of a Vietcong or North Vietnamese charge of improper treatment of their
captured personnel by United States military forces in Vietnam,73 there has been
one charge of improper action in this respect made in the United States.
As early as 1964, when American personnel.were serving in Vietnam solely
as advisers to South Vietnamese military units, reports began to reach the United
States of the maltreatment ofVietcong prisoners ofwar by members of the South
Vietnamese combat forces?4 American photographers and newsmen were
present during these episodes and, presumably, American military personnel
were also present. Photographs of this nature continued to appear in the
American press from time to time durin? 1965 and occasionally, although much
more rarely, during subsequent years? In a few instances American personnel
were pictured standing by while the maltreatment of the prisoners of war
76
occurred. These incidents apparendy took place either at the scene of the
fighting or during evacuation from it.
Humanitarian reaction to these clear indications of violations of the
Convention quickly appeared in the United States.77 The legal problem
presented by these incidents, in view of the nature of the United States position
in Vietnam, is whether the United States had a duty or was in a;osition to do
more than remonstrate with the South Vietnamese authorities?
There is no provision in the Convention making a contracting party
responsible for violations committed by one of its allies against prisoners of war
captured and held by that ally. A search of the Final Record of the 1949
Diplomatic Conference which drafted the Convention has failed to bring to
light even a suggestion to this effect made by any delegation?9 The reasons for
this lacuna are obvious. To have included such a provision would have created
vicarious responsibility for a situation which, in the great majority of cases, could
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not be remedied by the state so held responsible. Moreover, no state would
willingly accept a responsibility which could well bring it into sharp conflict
with one or several of its allies during the course of a life-or-death struggle.
There was, then, no legal duty imposed upon the United States by the 1949
Convention to ensure that South Vietnamese troops did not maltreat personnel
captured by them. Of course, it is equally clear that the United States (and every
other contracting party) is under a moral obligation to exert all its influence to
bring ~bout full compliance with the relevant provisions of the Convention by
any other party engaged in armed conflict. 80
When units of the United States armed forces were committed to combat a
new situation arose, because, unlike the earlier period just mentioned, the
United States itself then began to take prisoners of war. These prisoners were
turned over to the South Vietnamese for detention in prisoner-of-war camps.
At first, the transfer of custody was made in the field immediately upon capture.
But apparently because most of the incidents of maltreatment occurred at this
time and in this area, in mid-1966 the United States changed its procedure.
Thereafter, prisoners of war captured by United States units were evacuated to
divisional headquarters and from there directly to the rear-area prisoner-of-war
81
The United States
camps maintained by the South Vietnamese.
Commander-in-Chief in Vietnam has stated categorically that "these prisoners
are not being mistreated. They are handled in accordance with the provisions
of the Geneva Conventions.,,82 There is no evidence to indicate that his
83
statement is not correct, nor have any claims been made which contradict it.
Of course, even after prisoners of war captured by United States forces reach
the camps and are turned over to the custody of the South Vietnamese, the
United States remains under a contingent responsibility for their humane
. accordance WIt
. h th e proVIslons
..
. 84
treatment In
0 f t h e C onventlon.
VI. Charges Made Against South Vietnam

There appears to be little doubt that at least well into 1966 South Vietnamese
combat troops regularly maltreated captured enemy personnel by using threats,
85
torture, and other acts of violence in order to obtain intelligence information.
These acts were and remain direct violations of the law of war, whether
considered from the point of view of the entire Convention, Article 3, or
customary international law. The combined pressure of the ICRC and the
United States (and, perhaps, of other allied countries) has apparently gradually
made itself felt, at least at the official level. The Government of South Vietnam
has complied with the Convention by a liberal interpretation of the provisions
ofArticle 4 defining the categories ofpersons entitled to prisoner-of-war status, 86
by supplying lists of persons detained as prisoners of war to the Central Tracing
Agency of the ICRC,87 by disseminating to its troops information concerning
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the duties imposed upon captors by the Convention and by other methods of
instruction of its troops,88 and by permitting unlimited inspection visits to the
prisoner-of-war camps by delegates of the ICRC. 89 The fact that reports of
further instances of maltreatment of prisoners of war by South Vietnamese
combat troops have become more sporadic probably indicates that the campaign
of education has had some degree of success. However, it may also mean that
South Vietnamese combat commanders have been able to conceal most of such
incidents from those who might report them.
To summarize: while the South Vietnamese Government has now
substantially complied with the obligations which the Convention imposes upon
it, during the course ofa period extending over several years there was apparendy
an officially countenanced practice of the use of torture on newly-captured
prisoners of war by South Vietnamese combat troops for the purpose of
extracting information from them. The South Vietnamese Government appears
now to accept the fact that such conduct constituted a direct and major violation
of the Convention and, therefore, in 1966 instituted a campaign of education
which seems to have been at least partially successful in putting an end to this
grossly illegal practice. However, instances of maltreatment of newly-captured
prisoners of war by South Vietnamese combat troops continue to be reported. 90
The individuals responsible for such incidents, both soldiers who commit the
actual violence and commanders who permit and even encourage these acts, are
guilty of violations of the Convention and of the customary law of war.

VII. Charges Made Against North Vietnam
A. Paraditlg Prisoners of War
With respect to the North Vietnamese treatment of American prisoners of
91
war we have only the information which they have seen fit to disclose.
However, even this limited source of information has revealed one major
violation of the Convention and the threat of what was asserted to be another.
While this latter was apparendy prevented by an unprecedented mobilization of
world opinion by the United States, it will be discussed below in section VII B.
OnJuly 6, 1966, presumably to whip up local support for the trial of captured
American pilots as "war criminals,,,92 the North Vietnamese authorities caused
these men, handcuffed in pairs, to be paraded through the crowd-lined streets
93
of Hanoi. Word of the incident was broadcast by Radio Hanoi and press
releases 94 and photographs95 were issued by the official North Vietnamese press
agency.
The United States Government immediately charged that this constituted a
violation of the Convention. 96 The ICRC clearly was of the same opinion, for
onJuly 14, 1966, it drew the attention of the North Vietnamese Government
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to the fact that the Convention specifically prohibited the subjection ofprisoners
ofwar to public curiosity.97 The North Vietnamese did not deny the occurrence
of the incident; they merely called attention to their Krevious communications
concerning the nonapplicability of the Convention. 9
In May, 1967, Agence France Presse (the French news agency) reported from
Hanoi that three captured American pilots, one of whom was apparently
suffering from an injury, "were paraded through angry, shouting crowds" on
the streets of Hanoi and were later "put on display" at the International Press
99
Club in Hanoi. Once again the United States Government immediately
charged that this constituted a "flagrant violation" of the Convention and stated
that it was sending a protest to North Vietnam through the ICRC. 100
Over a century ago Francis Lieber's first codification of the customary law of
war included a statement to the effect that prisoners of war were not to be
subjected to any "indignity." 101 The 1929 Geneva Prisoner-of-War
Convention,102 the predecessor of the Convention with which we are here
concerned, had (in its Article 2) a prohibition against subjecting prisoners of war
to "insults and public curiosity." In interpreting this provision in the course of
World War II, the Judge Advocate General of the Army said: "The 'public
curiosity' against which Article 2 ... protects them is the curious and perhaps
scornful gaze of the crowd.... " 103 During World War II a group of American
prisoners of war was marched through the streets of Rome by the Nazis as a
propaganda measure. Mter the war the Nazi commander responsible for the
march was tried and convicted of the war crime of failini1 to protect prisoners
of war in his custody from insults and public curiosity. 04 The International
Military Tribunal for the Far East, the Pacific counterpart of the International
Military Tribunal of Nuremberg fame, included in its opinion a heading entitled
"Prisoners of War Humiliated" and listed thereunder various episodes in which
prisoners of war had been marched down city streets and exhibited to jeering
crowds, specifically labeling such treatment as a violation of the law of war. 10
It has already been noted that the Military Tribunal which heard TIle High
Command Case at Nuremberg found that the protection of prisoners of war from
insults and public curiosity was a part of the customary law of war recognized
.
106
bY Cl'vili'ze d nacrons.
Both Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention contain provisions which prohibit
the exhibiting of prisoners of war by parading them through city streets; and it
would appear that this rule has most probably attained the status of being part
of the customary law of war. 107 It follows that the actions of North Vietnamese
authorities on the two occasions mentioned (and on other less well publicized
occasions) were violations of the Convention and of the customary law of
108
war.
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B. War Crimes Trials
It will be recalled that in answering the letter from the ICRC in August,
1965, North Vietnam referred to captured American pilots as "major [war]
criminals caught in flagrante delicto and liable for judgment in accordance with
the laws ofthe Democratic Republic ofVietnam." 109 Many statements ofsimilar
import were subsequently made by the North VietnameseYO By mid-July,
1966, press dispatches from Communist newsmen in Hanoi were mentioning
ll1
that trials were definitely planned
and tension began to build in the United
112
States.
It was then that the United States mounted a diplomatic offensive
which resulted in the intervention of personages from around the world,
including those who sided with the United States position in Vietnam, those
who opposed it, and those who were neutral. 113 On July 23, 1966, the North
Vietnamese Government announced the appointment of a committee "to
investigate United States 'war crimes",114 and then, on that same day, North
Vietnam President Ho Chi Minh took advantage of a cabled inquiry from the
Columbia Broadcasting System to state that there was "no trial in view" for the
American pilots. lIS A few days later Ho was quoted as saying that the "main
criminals" were not captured pilots, "but the persons who sent them
there-Johnson, Rusk, McNamara-these are the ones who should be brought
to trial.,,116 For ten days inJuly, 1966, there was excitement and debate on this
subject throughout the world, with claims, counterclaims, and citation oflegal
authorities and purported legal authorities for and against the trial.
Actually, the statement and allegations made by the North Vietnamese in
their August 31, 1965, letter to the ICRC and frequently thereafter pose two
interwoven questions concerning the captured American pilots: (1) are they
entitled to the status of prisoners of war? and (2) do the North Vietnamese have
the right to try them for alleged war crimes ? It will be appropriate to discuss
these two questions in the order stated.
The captured pilots are all members of the United States Navy and Air Force.
They were captured when forced to eject from their planes while flying combat
missions over North Vietnam. They were wearing American flight uniforms
when captured and made no attempt to hide their identity. (Of course, this series
of statements includes a number of assumptions-but they all appear to be
reasonable ones and there is no indication that anyone of them is really disputed.)
These facts being accepted, the American pilots are entitled prima facie to
prisoner-of-war status under the 1907 Hague Regulations,117 the 1929 Geneva
Prisoner of-War Convention,118 and the 1949 Geneva Prisoner-of-War
119
Convention.
In fact, it would be difficult to imagine a more clear-cut case
of entitlement to such status.
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The North Vietnamese apparendy do not contest the facts stated and assumed
above, but they attempt to avoid the conclusion which necessarily flows from
these facts by asserting that the Convention does not apply to "war criminals." 120
The syllogism would be: war criminals are not entitled to the protection of the
Convention; American pilots are war criminals; therefore, American pilots are
not entided to the protection of the Convention. Both the major and the minor
premises of that syllogism are incorrect. The North Vietnamese position
therefore necessitates a brief review of the events preceding and following the
approval of Article 85 of the Convention by the 1949 Diplomatic
Conference. 121
When the war in the Pacific ended in 1945, General Yamashita, who had
commanded the unsuccessful Japanese defense of the Phillipine Islands, was
charged with a number of war crimes and was brought to trial before an
American Military Commission in Manila. His counsel contended that he was
entided to all of the trial protections contained in the 1929 Prisoner-of-War
Convention. These protections were denied to him and on appeal to the United
States Supreme Court (after his conviction and death sentence) the denial was
affirmed on the ground that the trial protections contained in that Convention
applied only to trials for post-capture--not pre-capture--offenses. 122
In the preparatory work which preceded the 1949 Diplomatic Conference,
the ICRC convened a group of "Government Experts" who recommended, as
one variation from the 1929 Convention, a provision that prisoners of war
prosecuted for pre-capture offenses should enjoy the benefits of the Convention
until convicted after a regular trial. When this was submitted to the XVIIth
International Red Cross Conference at Stockholm in 1948, where the final draft
which was to be the working draft for the 1949 Diplomatic Conference was
prepared, it was decided to change the provision drafted by the Government
Experts so that prisoners of war would continue to benefit by the provisions of
. even '!I,er
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At the Diplomatic Conference, the USSR proposed an amendment to the
draft provision under which once a prisoner of war had been convicted of a war
crime (apparendy this meant a conventional war crime) or a crime against
124
humanity, he could be treated as an ordinary criminal.
This was, in effect, a
return to the recommendation made by the Government Experts. General
Slavin, chief delegate of the USSR, stated to the committee charged with the
preparation of the Prisoner-of-War Convention, that the USSR proposal
125
applied only to prisoners of war who had been convicted.
The committee's
report to the Plenary Meeting called attention to the difference of approach
represented by the Stockholm draft and the USSR proposal, and stated that the
great majority of the committee considered that even after a prisoner of war had
been convicted of a pre-capture violation of the laws and customs of war, he
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should continue to enjoy the protection of the Convention. 126 The Diplomatic
Conference rejected the Soviet proposal and approved the Stockholm draft
..
127
provlSlon.
The effect of Article 85 of the Convention was, then, to change the rule
128
expounded in Yamashita and other similar cases.
Now a prisoner ofwar retains
the benefits of the Convention from the moment of capture to the moment of
release and repatriation. If, while in captivity, he is tried and convicted of a
pre-capture violation of the law of war he is entided to all the judicial safeguards
. 129
o f th e C onventlon.
The USSR and all of the other Communist countries, both those present at
the Diplomatic Conference in Geneva and those which subsequendy adhered
to the Convention, have made reservations to Article 85. 130 This fact caused
some concern to the United States Senate when it was asked to give its advice
and consent to the ratification of the Convention by the President. In its report
to the Senate the Committee on Foreign Relations said:
[I]n the light of the practice adopted by Communist forces in Korea of calling
prisoners of war "war criminals," there is the possibility that the Soviet bloc might
adopt the general attitude of regarding a significant number of the forces opposing
them as ipso facto war criminals, not entided to the usual guaranties provided for
prisoners of war. As indicated above, however, the Soviet reservation expressly
deprives prisoners ofwar of the protection of the convention only after conviction
in accordance with the convention.131
When North Vietnam advised the Swiss Government of its adherence to the
four 1949 Geneva Conventions in June 1957, the communication included a
reservation to Article 85 reading as follows:
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam declares that prisoners ofwar prosecuted
for and convicted of war crimes or crimes against humanity, in accordance with
the principles laid down by the Nuremberg Court ofJustice shall not benefit from
the present Convention, as specified in Article 85. 132
Having made this reservation, it must be assumed that the North Vietnamese
authorities fully understood its meaning-and it is difficult to find any real
133
ambiguity in it so far as the present problem is concerned.
The American
pilots have not been "prosecuted and convicted." Under Article 85 of the
Convention and the North Vietnamese reservation to it, they are entided to the
benefits of the Convention until prosecution and conviction for war crimes or
crimes against humanity have occurred. The North Vietnamese contention that
the American pilots are "war criminals" and not entided to the protection of
. .IS, t h erefcore, Wlt
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violation of the Convention to arbitrarily deny prisoner-of-war status to
individuals entitled to that status. If the North Vietnamese desire to comply with
the international commitment which they have made by voluntarily adhering
to the Convention, they are under an obligation to recognize that American
pilots captured while flying combat missions over North Vietnam are entitled
to the status of prisoners of war and to the protections provided by the
Convention which flow from that status.
The first question posed above, are American pilots entitled to the status of
prisoners of war, must be answered in the affirmative. This leads us to the second
question, do the North Vietnamese have the right to try them for alleged war
crimes?
In the discussions which took place in connection with the drafting ofArticle
85, it was at no time suggested by any delegation that prisoner-of-war status
should protect an individual from prosecution for an alleged pre-capture offense
which constituted a violation of the law of war. In fact, all of the parties who
engaged in the discussion apparently assumed that this was the rule. As we have
just seen, the only dispute on this subject concerned the regime under which
the detaining power would be entitled to place the individual qfter his trial and
conviction for a pre-capture offense. Under the circumstances, there seems to
be little doubt that the second question posed, do the North Vietnamese have
the right to try the American pilots for war crimes alleged to have been
committed prior to capture, should also be answered in the affirmative.
However, this answer requires amplification, because standing alone it is
subject to misconstruction. In the first place, the right to try a prisoner of war
for an offense which he is alleged to have committed prior to capture does not
mean that there is a right to treat him prior to trial and conviction in the manner
in which he mig~t be treated qfter trial and conviction. (This, of course, is
inherent in the discussion and resolution of the first question on this subject
discussed immediately above.) In other words, a prisoner ofwar retains the status
of prisoner of war, and all the protections incident thereto, at least until he has
been finally convided.
In the second place, while it appears that the North Vietnamese charge against
the American pilots is that they have been guilty of bombing nonmilitary targets,
such as civilian residential areas,135 at this stage in the development of the law
of war, there may be considerable doubt expressed as to whether even
"target-area" bombing, a much more indiscriminate and inhumane act than that
apparently charged against the American airmen, is a violation of international
law. During World War II both sides engaged in this type of warfare. No one
who lived through that period or has read its history could have forgotten the
German bombing ofsuch targets as Warsaw, London, Coventry and Rotterdam,
and the Allied bombing of Berlin, Essen, Cologne and Tokyo. No political
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leader, no military commander, and no ainnan was ever convicted ofany alleged
136
war crime arising out of these activities.
One will look in vain in the opinions
of the IMT or of the IMTFE for any reference to such activities as constituting
a war crime. For more than ten years the ICRC has been endeavoring, so far
with not even a modicum of success, to evolve a convention which would
protect the civilian pOfulations in time of war and which would be acceptable
13
This&roposed Convention, in its Article 10, specifically
to the governments.
forbids target-area bombing. 8 The fact that it is considered necessary to include
such a prohibition in a new draft international convention on the law of war
would seem to indicate rather conclusively that no such prohibition is presendy
included therein. 139 And, as has been stated, if target-area bombing is not
definitely oudawed, then certainly the lesser charge which appears to have been
levelled against the American pilots does not come within a prohibited category.
In the third place, we have moved far along the road from the era ofvicarious
punishment to a point where individuals are punished only for their own acts.
While evidence, such as "confessions," might be available to the North
Vietnamese with respect to some of the airmen, what of the others? Why is the
charge of being a war criminal levelled against every captured American airman
held by the North Vietnamese?140 Certainly, there is no evidence available to
them that every captured American airman participated in bombing or other
attacks on purely civilian targets. Some of the ainnen were probably shot down
on their first missions before they could drop a bomb. Some were probably
flying in unarmed reconnaissance planes, perhaps as photographers. Some were
probably flying fighter protection armed only with air-to-air weapons. These,
and probably many others, are within categories against whom no legitimate
.
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Finally, there arises the problem of whether prisoners of war accused of
pre-capture war crimes can be or should be tried during the course of hostilities.
On this subject the author has previously said:
While there was never any concrete proposal made at the Diplomatic
Conference that trials of prisoners of war for pre-capture offenses should be
postponed until the cessation of hostilities, the matter was the subject of
inconclusive discussion during the debate on Article 85, two delegates (Lamarle
of France and Slavin ofthe U.S.S.R.) expressing the opinion that such trials should
not be put offuntil the close of hostilities, and one delegate (Gardner of the United
Kingdom) expressing the opposite view. The International Committee ofthe Red
Goss has long taken the position that, ifsuch a trial is conducted during the course
of hostilities, an accused does not have a fair opportunity to produce all of the
evidence which might be available to disprove or lessen his responsibility.
As we have already seen, a number of prisoners of war were tried for alleged
pre-capture offenses during the course ofWorId War II. The patent un£rirness of
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these trials glaringly reveals the danger of trials for pre-capture offenses conducted
during the course of the war. 142
To summarize: captured American ainnen are entitled to the status of
prisoners of war until such time as they have been prosecuted and convicted of
pre-capture violations of the law of war; while they may legally be tried during
the course of hostilities, there are serious practical objections to such a procedure;
and, ifthey are tried, they must be afforded all of the judicial safeguards contained
in the Convention.
VIII. Charges Made Against the Vietcong

Very little infonnation is available as to how many prisoners ofwar, American
or South Vietnamese, are held by the Vietcong; even less is known as to how
they are being treated. However, there is reason to know that they do hold some
American prisoners of war-and that there have been at least two identical
instances of major violations of the law of war in the treatment of prisoners by
the Vietcong.
As we have seen, despite Vietcong insistence to the contrary, the generally
accepted position appears to be that insurgents such as the Vietcong are bound
by the provisions of Article 3 of the Convention; 143 and that, in any event, they
144
are at a minimum bound by the customary law ofwar.
Specifically, it appears
to be well established that customary international law prohibits the use of
violence and acts of cruelty against prisoners of war and, in all probability, also
prohibits making them the objects of reprisals. 145
On April 9, 1965, a Vietcong terrorist was tried, convicted and sentenced to
death by a South Vietnamese court. At that time the Vietcong announced that
if the sentence of execution was carried out, Gustav C. Hertz, a kidnapped
civilian American aid officer, would be shot. 146 The terrorist was apparently not
executed. Whether or not the threat against Hertz was the reason for the
clemency shown the terrorist has not been disclosed.
On June 22, 1965, another Vietcong terrorist was executed by a South
Vietnamese firing squad in Saigon after he had been tried, convicted and
147
sentenced for acts of terrorism by a South Vietnamese special military court.
Three days later both Radio Hanoi and the Liberation Radio announced that
an American soldier held as a prisoner of war by the Vietcong (Sergeant Harold
G. Bennett) had been executed in reprisal for the execution of the Vietcong
terrorist. 148 The United States labeled the act as "murder"; and a statement
released by the Department of State said that "people around the world cannot
help but be appalled and revolted by this show of wanton inhumanity.,,149
On September 22, 1965, three more Vietcong terrorists were executed in Da
Nang after a trial, conviction and death sentence by a South Vietnamese court.
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Four days later, on September 26, the Liberation Radio announced that the
Vietcong had retaliated by the executions of two American prisoners of war,
150
Captain Humbert R. V ersage [Versace] and Sergeant Kenneth M. Roraback.
Once again the United States labeled these reprisal executions as "murder" and
151
as violations of the Convention.
It filed a protest with the ICRC which was
transmitted to and rejected by the NLF. 152
A "reprisal" is defined as an otherwise illegal act committed by one side in
an armed conflict in order to put pressure on the other side to compel it to
abandon a course of illegal acts which it has been committing and to comply
with the law of war. 153 For a reprisal (a normally illegal act) to be legal there
are three requirements: the act of the state against which it is directed must have
been illegal; it must not be directed against an individual who, by the law of
war, is specifically protected against reprisals or against acts of the nature that the
contemplated reprisal will take; and it must be directed against the state which
first violated the law of war.
Were the alleged acts of reprisal of the Vietcong mentioned above valid
applications of the rules governing reprisals? The first requirement for a valid
reprisal is that the act or acts against which it is directed have been illegal. The
acts against which these reprisals were directed were the June 22 and September
22, 1965, executions of the Vietcong terrorists. Were those executions illegal?
According to the newspaper accounts, in each instance the individuals had been
tried, convicted and sentenced by a South Vietnamese court in accordance with
the law of South Vietnam. 154 While the National Liberation Front called the
June 22 execution "[a] crime of bloodthirsty men" 155 and presumably feels the
same about the September 22 execution, it has never indicated in what way the
executions constituted a crime- other than the implication that it is a crime to
try, convict and execute a Vietcong apprehended in the course of committing
what was probably a Vietcong approved and ordered act of terrorism.
The reprisals, then, failed to meet the first requirement for a valid reprisal,
that it be called forth by an illegal act by the other side. Now let us examine the
second requirement for a reprisal to be valid under the law of war-that it not
be directed against a specifically protected person. Shortly after the Second
Hague Peace Conference of 1907 the German War Office issued a War Book
which escaped general attention until some years later. During the course of
World War I, it became well known and widely condemned because of its
emphasis on the the principle of military necessity and its disregard for the
customary and conventional law of war. Concerning reprisals against prisoners
of war the War Book said:
As regards the admissibility of reprisals, it is to be remarked that these are
objected to by numerous teachers ofintemationallaw on grounds of humanity.
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To make this a matter of principle and apply it to every case, exhibits however,
"a misconception due to intelligible but exaggerated and unjustifiable feelings of
humanity, of the significance, the seriousness and the right of war. It must not be
overlooked that here also the necessity of war, and the safety of the State are the
first consideration, and not regard for the unconditional freedom ofprisoners from
molestation. "
That prisoners should only be killed in the event of extreme necessity, and that
only the duty of self-preservation and the security of one's own State can justify
a proceeding of this kind is today universally admitted. 156
Thus, even a directive which was subjected to almost universal condemnation
limited reprisals against prisoners of war to cases of "extreme necessity,"
self-preservation, and the security of the State.
World War I so vividly demonstrated the inhumanity of reprisals against
helpless prisoners of war that restrictions on the use of this procedure were
incorporated into a number of agreements reached by the belligerents for the
protection ofprisoners ofwar during the course of those hostilities. 157 A specific
provision completely prohibiting re~risals against prisoners ofwar was thereafter
included in the 1929 Convention.! 8
Writing in 1942, an American scholar stated that "it seems reasonable to
assume that reprisals, with prisoners of war as the objects, are permissible within
limits in customary intemationallaw.,,159 A few years later the legality ofreprisals
against civilian hostages was considered at great length in The Hostage Case, a
decision by one of the Nuremberg Military Tribunals. The Tribunal said:
It is a fundamental rule ofjustice that the lives of persons may not be arbitrarily
taken. A fair trial before a judicial body affords the surest protection against
arbitrary, vindictive, or whimsical application of the right to shoot human beings
in reprisal. It is a rule of intemationallaw, based on these fundamental concepts
ofjustice and the rights of individuals, that the lives of persons may not be taken
in reprisal in the absence of a judicial finding that the necessary conditions exist
and the essential steps have been taken to give validity to such action.... We
have no hesitancy in holding that the killing of members of the population in
reprisal without judicial sanction is itself unlawful. 160
Inasmuch as members of the general public had not then been recognized as
specially protected persons, it would appear that, a fortiori, everything the
Tribunal said about the protections to which civilians were entitled would apply
to prisoners of war.
In considering the opinion quoted above, another Nuremberg Military
Tribunal, which would probably not have permitted reprisal executions under
any circumstances, stated in its opinion in The High Command Case:
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In the Southeast Case [Hostage Case], United States v. Wilhelm List, et al.,
(Case No.7), the Tribunal had occasion to consider at considerable length the
law relating to hostages and reprisals. It was therein held that under certain very
restrictive conditions and subject to certain rather extensive safeguards, hostages
may be taken, and after a judicial finding ofstrict compliance with all preconditions
and as a last desperate remedy hostages may even be sentenced to death. It was
held further that similar drastic safeguards, restrictions, and judicial preconditions
apply to so-called "reprisal prisoners." If so inhumane a measure as the killing oj
innocent personsJor offenses ojothers, even when drastically soJeguarded and limited, is ever
pennissible under any theory oj international law, killing without Jull compliance with all
requirements would be murder.lfkilling is not pennissible under any circumstances, then a
killing with Jull compliance with all the mentioned prerequisites still would be murder.
. . . In the instance of so-called hostage taking and killing, and the so-called
reprisal killings with which we have to deal in this case, the safeguards and
preconditions required to be observed by the Southeast judgment were not even
attempted to be met or even suggested as necessary. Killings without compliance
with such preconditions are merely terror murders. Ifthe law is in fact that hostage
and reprisal killings are never permissible at all, then also the so-called hostage and
. al killi·ngs In
. thi s case are mereIy terror murd ers. 161
repns

And in reviewing the overall war crimes program which followed World War
II and the law which evolved from it, the United Nations War Crimes
Commission, in publications issued in 1947 and in 1949, stated without
equivocation that the killing of prisoners of war without due cause violated both
. allaw. 162
. al·mternatJon
customary an d conventJon
Undeniably, then, there are compelling arguments to support the position
that reprisals against prisoners of war are prohibited by customary international
law. But even if one is unwilling to accept these arguments, certainly customary
international law does specifically prohibit all acts of cruelty and violence against
prisoners of war, 163-who are, therefore, protected persons in so far as this type
of treatment is concerned. And with equal certainty it can be stated that in all
civilized countries killing is an act both of cruelty and ofviolence. Hence, killing
a prisoner of war as a reprisal constitutes cruelty and violence against a person
who is protected from such treatment by customary international law. The
reprisals, then, also failed to meet the second requirement for a valid reprisal,
that they not be directed against a protected person.
The third requirement for a legal reprisal under international law is that it be
directed against the state which had first violated the law ofwar. 164 The" crime"
charged by the NLF as the basis for the reprisal was, beyond dispute, an act of
the South Vietnamese authorities, and not of the American authorities. The
alleged acts of terrorism were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
South Vietnam, the culprits were tried by South Vietnamese courts which
reached the decisions finding guilt and ordered the death sentence imposed, and
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the executions were carried out by the South Vietnamese authorities. If reprisals
were justified, and no ground for them has so far come to light, under the law
of war they should have been directed against the state which had by its alleged
illegal conduct created the need for and the right to take reprisals. This was
obviously not done-and the reason why it was not done is equally obvious.
To summarize: to be authorized by international law, reprisals, which are
otherwise illegal acts, must meet certain specific conditions. The undisputed
facts clearly disclose that the Vietcong had no legal justification for taking reprisals
and, moreover, that the reprisals were taken against prisoners of war who were
protected persons under customary international law and against whom reprisals,
especially of a cruel or violent character, were specifically prohibited both by
international legislation binding upon the Vietcong and by customary
international law. Under these circumstances, the reprisals taken against the
American prisoners of war were nothing less than murder and constituted war
crimes for which, pursuant to the Nuremberg principles upon which the
Communists so heavily rely, those who ordered the executions and those who
carried them out are all subject to penal sanctions.

IX. Conclusion
A number of conclusions have been reached in the course of this discussion.
To recapitulate:
1. There is no legal justification for the position taken by the North
Vietnamese that they are not bound by the 1949 Geneva Prisoner-of-War
Convention. At the very least, they are bound by the provisions of Article 3
thereo£
2. While there is some legal basis for the position taken by the NLF that it
is not even bound by the provisions of Article 3 of the Convention, on balance
the decision probably should be that it is so bound. In any event, it is bound by
the customary law of war.
3. A state which is a party to hostilities is not legally responsible when an ally
violates the provisions of the Convention, but it is morally bound to attempt to
persuade its ally to conform to the obligations accepted by adhering to the
Convention. It does have a contingent responsibility for the proper treatment
of prisoners of war captured by its armed forces and turned over to the custody
of an ally for detention.
4. Torture or other maltreatment of prisoners of war in order to obtain
intelligence information from them, or for any other reason, or for no reason,
constitutes a serious violation of the Convention.
5. Parading prisoners of war before a hostile populace constitutes a violation
of the prohibition, contained in conventional and customary international law,
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against subjecting them to insults, public curiosity and humiliating and degrading
conduct.
6. Even under a reservation to Article 85 of the Convention, such as that
made by North Vietnam, it is a serious violation of the Convention to deny
captured enemy personnel prisoner-of-war status on the ground that they are
war criminals prior to their prosecution and conviction ofa pre-capture war crime
by a trial court in which they have been accorded all of the required judicial
safeguards.
7. There is no legal impediment to the trial ofa prisoner ofwar for an alleged
pre-capture war crime while hostilities are still being conducted. However, as
noted immediately above, such a prisoner of war continues to be entided to all
of the protection of the Convention, including the judicial safeguards therein
contained.
8. Reprisals against prisoners of war are prohibited by the Convention and,
probably, by customary international law. In any event, a reprisal which includes
a corporal act, such as killing, against a prisoner of war is prohibited by Article
3 of the Convention and by customary international law, both of which prohibit
cruelty and acts of violence against prisoners of war.
And finally, although the application of the Convention is presumably not
dependent upon reciprocity, persistent and regular refusal by the Communist
nations to be bound by it during actual cases of anned conflict in which they
are involved may compel other countries to give second thoughts to the doctrine
which requires compliance without reciprocal compliance.
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camps after the fall of Germany. Some sought and obtained asylum in Switzerland. Castren, The Present Law
of War and Neutrality 165 (1954).
20. Le Comite International de la Croix-Rouge et Ie Conflit de Coree: Recueil de Documents 16 (1952).
21. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front 141, 145 (1966); Vatcher, Panmunjom 116 (1958).
22. British Ministry of Defence, Treatment of British Prisoners of War in Korea 3-34 (1955); Vatcher,
Panmunjom, photograph opposite 114 (1958),Joyce, Red Cross International 200-201 (1959).
23. See text in connection with notes 8 and 9 supra.
24. Although not engaged in armed conflict with a Comnmnist opponent, the French indirecdy followed
this course of action during the civil war in Algeria with the result that the Provisional Government of the
Algerian Republic, the political arm of the rebellion, not only committed itself to apply the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, but considered it appropriate to actively seek French compliance. Algerian Office, White Paper
on the Application of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 in the Franco-Algerian Conflict (1960). The White
Paper cites (at 13) a newspaper article by Professor Roger Pinto, of the Faculty of Law of the University of
Paris, giving as one reason for the French reluctance to apply the Conventions "the absence of reciprocity in
respect to the humanitarian rules."
25. This argument is particularly applicable to Article 3 dealing with armed conflict not ofan international
character, note 34 infra, inasmuch as a proposed provision requiring reciprocity, which had been included in
the working draft, was intentionally deleted by the 1949 Diplomatic Conference. Castren, Civil War 86 (1966);
Coursier, L'Evolution du Droit International Humain, 99 Hague Recueil des Cours 357,395 (1960); Pinto,
Les Rcgles du Droit International Concernant la Guerre Civile, 114 Hague Recueil des Cours 451, 530
(1965).
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26. Under the third paragraph of Article 2, parties to the Convention are not bound with respect to
another party to the conflict which is not a party to the Convention unless "the latter accepts and applies the
provisions thereof." Under these circumstances it is somewhat difficult to accept the contention that a party
to the Convention is absolutely bound when the other party to the conflict is a party to the Convention, even
though the other party patently flaunts it and does not even purport to apply its provisions. Such a construction
merely encourages adherences by states which have no intention of ever complying with the Convention. Is
this, perhaps, what has occurred?
At the Hearings held to determine whether the Senate should give its advice and consent to the ratification
of the 1949 Conventions by the President, the then General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Wilbur
M. Brucker, testified: "Should war come and our enemy should not comply with the conventions, once we
both had ratified-what then would be our course of conduct? The answer to this is that to a considerable
extent the United States would probably go on acting as it had before, for, as I pointed out earlier, the treaties
are very largely a restatement of how we act in war anyway.
"If our enemy showed by the most flagrant and general disregard for the treaties, that it had in fact thrown
off their restraints altogether, it would then rest with us to reconsider what our position might be." Hearings
on the Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., at 11 (1955).
27. Meeker, The Legaliry of U.S. Participation in the Defense ofViet-Nam, 54 Dep't State Bull. 474,
477 (1966). In a speech delivered to the Foreign Policy Association on Nov. 14, 1967, Secretary ofState Rusk
ridiculed those who take the position that the fighting in Vietnam is '1ust a civil war." 57 Dep't State Bull.
735, 740 (1967). Of course, his argument was based largely upon the ground that North Vietnamese Army
units had been committed to the fighting in South Vietnam; while those who argue that it is a civil war draw
the opposite conclusion from this same fact! Secretary Rusk does strengthen his argument by pointing to the
post-World War II problem ofthe bifurcated States which appear in each instance to have become two separate
sovereignties: Germany, Korea, and Vietnam.
28. Moore, Underwood & McDougal, The Lawfulness of United States Assistance to the Republic of
Vietnam 32 (unpublished ms., Yale Law School, May 1966); Moore, The Lawfulness of Military Assistance
to the Republic of Vietnam, 61 Am]. Intl L. 1,2 (1967);]ohnson, Aquinas, Grotius and the Vietnam War,
16 Quis Custodiet? 69, 67, 70 (1967); Kutner, "International" Due Process for Prisoners ofWar, 21 U. Miami
L. Rev. 721, 730 (1967). Many of those who support the official position do not find it necessary to reach
the question of the nature of the conflict. Deutsch, The Legaliry of the United States Position in Vietnam, 52
A.B.AJ. 436 (1966). In Partan, Legal Aspects of the Vietnam Conflict, 46 B.U.L. Rev. 281, 299 (1966), the
author discusses the problem but reaches no conclusion. See also, the ICRC letter, notes 3 and 5 supra.
29. Fried (ed.), Vietnam and International Law 63 (1967); Falk, International Law and the United States
Role in the Viet Nam War, 75 Yale LJ. 1122, 1127 and passim (1966); Standard, United States Intervention
in Vietnam is not Legal, 52 A.B.AJ. 627, 630 (1966); Wright, Legal Aspects of the Viet-Nam Situation, 60
Am.]. Int'l L. 750, 756 (1966). Standard appears to argue from a conclusion already reached when, after
pointing out the State Department position, he says: "It is hardly open to dispute that the present conflict in
South Vietnam is essentially a civil war." Certainly, Messrs. Rusk and Meeker (the latter the Legal Adviser of
the Department of State) would dispute it! And Kutner, supra note 28, just as easily reaches the opposite
conclusion, stating: "Considering Communism's commitment to the success of all wars of 'national hoeration'
and the participation of United States military on a large, escalating scale, it would be unrealistic to consider
the conflict as purely domestic." The dispute on this question clearly indicates the correctness of the statements
that "the dividing line between international and internal war is often exceedingly tenuous" (Greenspan,
International Law and its Protection for Participants in Unconventional Warfare, 341 Annals 30, 31 (1962»
and that "all international war is, to some extent, civil war, and all civil war, international war." Pinto, supra
note 25, at 455 (translation mine).
30. See Stone, Legal Controls ofInternationai Conflict 313 n.85 (Rev. ed. 1959), where the following
appears: " ••• Art. 2, para. 1, of the revised Prisoners of War Convention, 1949, declaring its provisions
applicable not only to declared war but also to 'any armed conflict ... even if a state of war is not recognized'
by a belligerent Contracting Party, is a welcome recognition of the need to place the point beyond doubt."
And in Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 22-23
(1960) [hereinafter referred to as Commentary], it is stated: "By its general character, this paragraph deprives
belligerents, in advance, of the pretexts they might in theory put forward for evading their obligations. There
is no need for a formal declaration ofwar, or for the recognition ofthe existence ofa state ofwar, as preliminaries
to the application of the Convention. The occurrence of de facto hostilities is sufficient.
" •.• Any difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of members of the armed
forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the Parties denies the existence of
a state of war." And, finally, in Institute of Law, Academy of Sciences of the USSR, International Law 420
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(ca. 1960) [hereinafter referred to as Soviet International Law], this statement is made: "The absence ofa formal
declaration ofwar does not deprive hostilities which have in fact begun, of the character of war from the point
of view of the need to observe its laws and customs. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 require that their
signatories apply these Conventions, which are a component part of the laws and customs of war, in the event
of a declaration of war or in any armed conflict, even if one of the parties to the conflict does not recognize
the existence of a state of war."
31. A news article from Cairo which appeared in the N.Y. Times, Feb. 12, 1966 at 12, col. 3, stated:
"The sources quoted the [North Vietnamese] Ambassador as having rejected the American contention that
United States airmen captured in attacks on North Vietnam should be treated as prisoners of war under the
terms of the Geneva conventions.
He was reported to have told influential Egyptians that this was impossible "because this is a case where
no war has been declared" by either country.
32. It will have been noted that the Convention provision quoted in the text states that the Convention
is applicable in an armed conflict between two or more High Contracting Parties even if a state of war is not
recognized by one of them. In Vietnam a state ofwar, in the legal sense, is not recognized by allY of the parties
involved. 52 Dep't State Bull. 403 (1965). Does this remove the armed conflict in Vietnam from the reach of
Article 2? To answer this question in the affirmative would seem to be directly contrary to the intent of the
Article and to the object and purpose of the Convention. The ICRC states that it does not avoid Article 2.
Pictet, supra note 30, at 23. Lauterpacht believed that it was the intention of the draftsmen to make the
Convention applicable even if a state of war was not recognized by "one or both of them." 2 Lauterpacht's
Oppenheim, International Law 369 n.6 (7th ed. 1952).
33. One of the major purposes of the provision was to preclude a State from indulging in the excuses
put forward by Japan during the China Incident and by Nazi Germany during World War II as a basis for not
applying earlier humanitarian conventions: that there had been no declaration of war, that legally a state of
war did not exist, that the existence of a state of war was not recognized, that the armed conflict was only a
"police action," etc. See theJudgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 1008-09 (mimeo.
1949) [hereinafter referred to as IMTFEJudgment], Latyshev; The 1949 Geneva Conventions Concerning
the Protection of Victims of War, 7 The Soviet State and Law 121 (1954) (original in Russian).
34. Article 3 states:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one
of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the
following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who
have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any
other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded
on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever
with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment
and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized
as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may
offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavor to bring into force, by means of special
agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the
conflict.
35. Statement of Mr. Morosov (USSR), Final Record, supra note 13, Vol. lID, at 325-26; Pictet,
Commentary, supra note 30, at 34.
36. Pictet, The XXth International Conference of the Red Cross: Results in the Legal Field, 7 J. Int'l
Comm'nJurists 3, 15 (1966).
37. "[FJuture generations may consider it a sad commentary on our times that the nations of the world
thought it necessary in these conventions to provide that in case of an internal conflict, murder, mutilation,
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torture and other cruel treatment should not be practiced on prisoners and other noncombatants .... " Yingling
& Ginnane, The Geneva Conventions of1949 in 46 Am.]. Int'l L. 393, 396 (1952).

38. Greenspan, supra note 29, at 40; Note, The Geneva Conventions of 1949: Application in the
Vietnamese Conflict,S Va.]. Int'l L. 243, 249 (1965).
39. Pictet, supra note 36; de la Pradelle, Le Contrale de L'Application des Conventions Humanitaires
en cas de Conflit Arme, 2 Annuaire Fran~ais de Droit International 343, 364 (1956).
40. Pictet, Commentary, supra note 3D, at 28-34.
41. Id. at 32. During the debate General Slavin (USSR) made the following statement: "fTlhe United
Kingdom Delegation had alluded to the fact that colonial and civil wars were not regulated by international
law, and therefore that decisions in this respect would be out of place in the text of the Conventions. This
theory was not convincing, since though the jurists themselves were divided in opinion on this point, some
were of the view that civil war was regulated by international law. Since the creation of the Organization of
the United Nations this question seemed settled. Article 2 of the Charter provided that Member States must
ensure peace and world security.... Colonial and civil wars therefore come within the purview ofinternational
law." Final Record, supra note 13, Vol. Iill, at 14.
42. The Stockholm (working) draft would have made the entire Convention applicable. Id., Vol. I, at
73. The provisions of the draft article proposed by the USSR would have obligated each party to an armed
conflict not of an international character to implement all of the provisions ofthe Convention which guarantee
"humane treatment of prisoners of war" and "the application of all established rules for the treatment of
prisoners of war." Id., Vol. III, Annex 15, at 28.
43. In construing the provision which was adopted, Pictet, Commentary, supra note 3D, at 42, states:
"In the case of armed conflict not of an international character ... the Parties to the conflict are legally only
bound to observe Article 3, and may ignore all the other Articles.... "
44. Id. at 37; Note, The Geneva Conventions of 1949: Application in the Vietnamese Conflict,S Va.
]. Int'l L. 243, 248 (1965).
45. Pinto, supra note 25, at 529. Pinto says: "When the parties to the civil war receive foreign assistance,
the assisting States have a strict obligation to comply with and to require compliance with Article 3 .... Thus
the United States and the Democratic RepUblic of Vietnam are equally responsible for the application of
Article 3 in the civil war on the tetritory of South Vietnam." (Translation mine).
46. Of course, established governments have not infrequendy failed to comply with their obligations
under Article 3-but this was not necessarily because they considered Article 3 invalid per se. See note 24
supra. As a matter of fact, when the French finally agreed to permit the ICRC to function in Algeria, it was
specifically stated that this action was taken "in accordance with Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions."
LeClercq, L'Application du Statut du Prisonnier de Guerre depuis la Convention de Geneve de 1949, in 43
Revue de Droit International et de Droit Compare 35,45 (1966).
47. In Yingling & Ginnane, supra note 37, at 396, the authors, both lawyer-members of the United
States delegation to the 1949 Diplomatic Conventions, said: "Insofar as Article 3 purports to bind the insurgent
party to the conflict to apply its provisions, its legal efficacy may be doubted."
48. See te,,:t in connection with note 9 supra.
49. For a discussion of the several theories which have been advanced for holding a rebel organization
bound by the provisions of Article 3, even though it had never itself agreed to be bound, see Note, The
Geneva Convention and the Treatment of Prisoners ofWar in Vietnam, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 851,856-58 (1967).
See also Lauterpacht, The Limits of the Operation of the Law of War, 30 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 206, 213 (1953),
where that noted authority said: "The effect of these provisions [relating to armed conflict not of an
international character) is to subject the parties to a civil war--including the party which is not a recognised
belligerent-to important restraints of the law of war... "
50. The correct jargon, of course, would be "national liberation movements."
51. Soviet International Law, supra note 3D, at 410; and see the further quotation from this textbook in
note 69 infra.
52. Pictet, Commentary, supra note 3D, at 38 (emphasis in original). He also states: "What Government
would dare to claim before the world ••• that, Article 3 not being applicable, it was entided to leave the
wounded uncared for, to torture and mutilate prisoners and take hostages? No Government can object to
observing, in its dealings with enemies, whatever the nature of the conflict between it and them, a few essential
rules which it in fact observes daily, under its own laws, when dealing with common criminals." Id. at 36-37.
Unfortunately, experience shows that some governments do just what is described, but without any such bald
admission
53. Several years ago the suggestion was made that in any armed conflict in which United Nations forces
were involved, they should not be bound by the law of war, but their opponent should be. The reaction to
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this proposal was violent and caustic, and properly so. See Bothe, Le Droit de la Guerre et les Nations Unies
(1967).
54. Pictet, Commentary, supra note 30, at 37-38. Of course, if they are mere brigands, they are not
entitled to the protection of the Convention.
55. It is essential to bear in mind that the last paragraph of Article 3 specifies that the fact that a party
complies with the provisions of the Article "shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict." This
provision was obviously included in order to permit the established government to comply with Article 3
without recognizing the existence of a state of belligerency with the insurgents. Paradoxically, in Algeria it
was the insurgents themselves who called attention to this provision of the Article. Algerian Office White
Paper, supra note 24, at 17-18.
56. See note 25 supra; Pictet, Commentary, supra note 30, at 35, Draper, The Geneva Conventions of
1949 at 114 Hague Recueil des Cours 59, 96 (1965).
57. See note 15 supra.
58. Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression: Opinion and Judgment 83 (1947).
59. rd. at 61-62. In speaking of Nazi violations of the law of war, the IMT said (at 57): "Prisoners of
war were ill-treated and tortured and murdered, not only in defiance of the well-established rules of
international law, but in complete disregard of the elementary dictates of humanity••.. "
60. United States v. von Leeb et aI., 10 Trials ofWar Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals
1 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Trials]. This opinion carries over into Vol. 11 of the series.
61. 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 47 Stat. 2021, T.S. No.
846, 118 L.N.T.S. 343.
62. United States v. von Leeb et aI., 10 Trials 1 at 11 Trials 532-34 (1948).
63. Note, The Geneva Convention and the Treatment of Prisoners of War in Vietnam, 80 Harv. L.
Rev. 851, 858 (1967). A well known French ell.1'ert in this field has said: "These obligations [enumerated in
Article 3] correspond to those which the domestic public law of civilized States recognizes, even in cases of
insurrection, riot or civil war.... The summary execution of prisoners is prohibited." Pinto, supra note 25,
at 532 (translation mine).
64. United States v. von Leeb et aI., 10 Trials 1 at 11 Trials 535-38. But see Draper, supra note 56, at
90, where he states: "Undoubtedly, the prohibition of murder, mutilation or torture is absorbed in the
customary prohibitions of the law of war. On the other hand the taking of hostages, outrages upon personal
dignity, the passing of sentences by irregular tribunals, unfairly conducted, are not yet prohibited by the
customary law of war.... "
65. See note 34 supra.
66. See text in connection with notes 42 and 43 supra.
67. Pictet, Commentary, supra note 30, at 39 and 141; Smith, The Geneva Prisoner ofWar Convention:
An Appraisal, 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 880, 889 (1967); Pinto, supra note 63.
68. See text in connection with notes 156-163 infra.
69. Soviet International Law, supra note 30, at 423. Elsewhere (at 407) the statement is made that "the
laws and customs of war must be observed in any armed conflict."
70. It is not unusual to find, after hostilities have ended, that many incidents (or at least many of the
more gory details thereof) which have been reported during the course of hostilities, were basically figments
of the imagination: perhaps a minor incident which has been built up out of all proportion to the actual facts
by the addition of horrendous details, perhaps an entirely imaginary incident conceived by a public relations
officer or a reporter when headline news was lacking. However, the major violations to be discussed herein
are in the nature of admissions against interest: actions constituting, or allegedly constituting, violations by the
United States and the South Vietnamese, reported by the American news media, and actions constituting, or
allegedly constituting, violations by the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong, reported by Radio Hanoi and
the Liberation Radio, or by other sources in Hanoi. (As the alleged violation mentioned in note 9 supra does
not meet this criterion, it will not be discussed. It is, however, one of the most heinous violations not only of
the Convention, but also of the customary law of war).
71. See text in connection with note 6 supra.
72. Joint Communique of the Honolulu Conference, Feb. 8, 1966, at 54 Dep't State Bull. 304, 305
(1966), Joint Communique of the Manila Summit Conference, Oct. 25,1966, at 55 Dep't State Bull. 730,
731 (1966), Text of Communique of the Washington Meeting, April 21, 1967, at 56 Dep't State Bull. 747,
749 (1967). The nations involved in the latter two meetings were Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines,
South Korea, South Vietnam, Thailand, and the United States.
73. That incidents of maltreatment of prisoners of war by American personnel have occurred is beyond
dispute. There will never be a war fought in which there are not, at the very least, isolated instances of
maltreatment ofprisoners ofwar on both sides. The general moral environment in which the individual soldiers
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have been raised may be judged, and the training which they have received while in military service may be
measured, by the frequency with which such incidents occur. While Clergy and Laymen Concerned About
Vietnam in their book, In the Name ofAmerica (issued in February, 1968 afier this article had been substantially
completed), allocates a chapter of 45 pages to the reprinting of published items about the maltreatment of
prisoners of war, there is only an occasional, and frequendy misleading, indication (usually based on hearsay)
ofsuch misconduct by American troops. The weakness of the "evidence" quoted to support the organization's
thesis of misconduct is, in itself, extremely persuasive of the inaccuracy of the conclusion reached by one of
the commentators (at 23) that "these combat practices are so \videspread in their occurrence as to suggest that
their systematic commission is a direct result of decisions rcached at the highest levels of civilian and military
command." When Ambassador Harriman sent the ICRC a Department of Defense report on the methods
used by the several military services of the United States to disseminate information concerning the
requirements of the Conventions, the ICRC President replied: "We are convinced that in the context of the
war in Vietnam the U.S. Forces are devoting a major effort to the spread of knowledge on the Geneva
Conventions." Letter from Samuel A. Gonard to W. Averell Harriman, January 5, 1968, on file in the
Department of State.
74. A series of photographs and extracts from news stories recording maltreatment of prisoners of war
by the South Vietnamese which had appeared in a number of respected American publications were collected
and published in a brochure entided What are we tied to in Vietnam? by Massachusetts Political Action for
Peace, Cambridge, Mass. (1964).
75. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 22,1965, at 3B; id. Nov. 3, 1965, at 2A; id. April 27, 1966, at 2A; id.
Feb. 9, 1968, at lB.
76. Id. Dec. 30, 1965, at lA. Photographs indicating kind and generous treatment by American personnel
have also appeared (id. Mar. 5, 1966, at 2A, Mar. 6,1966 at 12A), but these are suspect as thcy are self-serving
and could easily have been posed for an enterprising photographer.
77. The brochure referred to in note 74 supra is a good example of this reaction.
78. A letter to the editor of the N.Y. Times from the Chairman of the University Committee on
Problems of War and Peace at the University of Pennsylvania said: "Responsible Americanjournalists have
frequendy reported the torture of Vietcong prisoners by their South Vietnamese captors. Because of these
repotts W. W. Rostow, chairman of the foreign policy research division of our State Department, was asked
••• 'why does the United States not abide by the Red Cross Convention in the treatment of Vietcong
prisoners?' His reply was that the United States does not take prisoners in Vietnam, and that we were merely
advisers to the South Vietnamese Government, which bore the responsibility for dealing with prisoners.
Because of this immoral apathy, and narrow legalistic position taken by our State Department, neither the
United States nor the South Vietnamese, nor the Vietcong, nor the North Vietnamese are committed to
adhere to any of the 'sanctions established by international law for the protection of war prisoners.''' N.Y.
Times,June 30, 1965, at 36, col. 5. The writer of the letter erred in both his assumptions and his conclusions,
but he certainly raised the moral issue.
79. This problem did arise in one context at the Diplomatic Conference-in connection with Article
12, which concerns custody of prisoners of war transferred from one ally to another. Under Article 12 the
transferring state retains some residual power with respect to prisoners ofwar it transfers, because it can request
return of the prisoners to its custody where the transferee state is guilty of violating the Convention in their
regard. Article 12 requires that this procedure be followed where the Protecting Power finds violations of the
Convention and the Detaining Power does not correct them. The Communist countries have all reserved as
to this Article, insisting that the capturing power remain fully responsible for any maltreatment suffered by
prisoners of war at the hands of the transferee Detaining Power. See, for example, the USSR reservation made
at the time of signing (75 U.N.T.S. 135,460) and maintained at the time of ratification (191 U N.T S. 367).
80. "The major United States effort, besides setting up its own procedures, has been to persuade the
South Vietnamese to go along. [South Vietnamese] Government officials, once openly hostile to the
convention, now grudgingly accept the American position. Much remains to be done, however, to persuade
the average South Vietnamese soldier to stop using torture. Each soldier will soon be shown a training film
prepared with American help. Most have already received booklets outlining the proper treatment of
prisoners." N.Y. Times,July 1, 1966, at 6, col. 3. See also Pinto supra note 45.
81. "United States offiicials are quiedy putting into effect an important change in their handling of
prisoners of war. Vietcong and North Vietnamese fighters captured on the batdefield will no longer be turned
over to the South Vietnamese Army immediately afier the fighting has died down. Instead, they will be sent
to American divisional headquarters and kept in American hand [sic] until they can be transferred to new
Vietnamese prisoner-of-war compounds.•.. The system has been adopted to enable the United States to
meet its responsibilities under Article 12 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 governing the treatment of
prisoners of war. The article requires the country turning prisoners over to another country to guarantee their
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well-being." N.Y. Times,July I, 1966, at 6, col. 3. The current official directive establishing this procedure
is United States Military Assistance Command, Directive No. 190-3, April 6, 1967.
82. 55 Dep't State Bull. 336, 338 (1966).
83. As stated in note 73 supra, there have without doubt been some acts of maltreatment ofprisoners of
war by American personnel. Thus, it was reported that in the trial by court-martial of Captain Howard B.
Levy there was defense testimony that American Special Forces ("Green Beret") personnel maintained a
"permissive policy toward the torture of Vietcong prisoners by the South Vietnamese" and that a bounty of
S10 was paid to the Montagnards for every right ear brought in. N.Y. Times, May 25, 1967, at 2, col. 3. In
view of the hearsay nature of the testimony, and the partisan context in which it was given, it does not fall
within the criterion adopted for this article. For another incident of alleged maltreatment see St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, Feb. 9, 1968, at lB, col. 1.
84. See note 79 supra. The United States has officially acknowledged its contingent responsibility. Dep't
State Vietnam Infonnation Note, No.9, Prisoners of War, Aug. 1967, at 3. It maintains small detachments
of American military police at each South Vietnamese prisoner-of-war camp, apparently to ensure that its
responsibility is being met.
85. See text in connection with note 74-76 supra. When the ICRC considered that there was sufficient
evidence to warrant raising the issue with the South Vietnamese authorities, the latter responded by conveying
to the ICRC "a file on atrocities attributed to NLF forces. It also invited the Committee to investigate the
plight of Vietnam prisoners held by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam." ICRC, The International
Committee and the Vietnam Conflict, 6 Int'I Rev. of the Red Cross 399, 405 (1966) [hereinafter referred to
as ICRC, Vietnam]. It does not appear that there was a denial of maltreatment by the South Vietnamese;
rather there was a defense of tu quoque aimed at the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese. Whatever the merit
of the cross-complaint, it is no excuse for violating the Convention.
86. lei. at 404-05; 7 id. 188. For the categories of persons being given prisoner-of-war status, see para.
4, United States Military Assistance Command, Directive No. 20-5, Sept. 21,1966.
87. E.g., 7 Int'l Rev. of the Red Cross 189 (1966).
88. 6 id. 141 (1966); 7 iel. 188 (1967). See also note 80 supra.
89. 5 id. 300, 470, and 481 (1965); 6 id. 98, 405, 542, and 597 (1966); 7 iel. 125 126, 188, 189, and 246
(1967). For a report of an unofficial and unauthorized visit by an American newsman to Pleiku, one of the
largest prisoner-of-war camps maintained by the South Vietnamese, see Gershen, A Close-Up Look at Enemy
Prisoners, Parade, Dec. 10, 1967, at 10. These ICRC inspection visits to the camps which have uniformly
included private and unsupervised consultations with selected prisoners of war designated by the ICRC
delegate, do not appear to have brought to light any instances of major violations of the Convention once
that captured personnel had reached the camps.
90. Wyant, Barbarity in Vietnam Shocks U.S., St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 9, 1968, at IB, col. 1. The
televised shooting of a just-captured Vietnamese by the head of the South Vietnamese National Police during
the attack on Saigon early in 1968 served to highlight this problem.
91. The sources of this infonnation have included broadcasts over Radio Hanoi, infonnation released
by the official North Vietnamese press agency, and an occasional dispatch from foreign reporters based in
Hanoi. Infonnation in depth, the complete accuracy of which is questionable, has been disseminated through
the medium of newsmen from other Communist countries. East Gennan journalists and photographers were
the source of the material used in the article, U.S. Prisoners of War in North Vietnam, Life, Oct. 20, 1967,
at 21-33. These East Gennan sources likewise provided the motion picture material purchased and televised
by NBC late in 1967. Infonnation concerning the treatment of South Vietnamese prisoners of war by the
North Vietnamese is of insufficient reliability for discussion.
92. See text in connection with notes 109-115 infra.
93. N.Y. Times,July 8,1966, at 3, col. 1.
94. Id. July 13, 1966, at I, col. 7, and 5, col. 1.
95. Id.July 8,1966, at3.
96. Id. at 3, col. 1.
97. ICRC, Vietnam, supra note 85, at 404. Art. 13 ofthe Convention requires the protection ofprisoners
of war "against insults and public curiosity." Para. 1 (c) of Art. 3, quoted at note 34 supra, prohibits "outrages
against personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment."
98. For the first of these communications, see text in connection with note 8 supra. The new reply also
stated that "the policy of the Government of the DRVN [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] as regards ellemy
captured ill time ifwar is a humane policy." (Emphasis added). The ambiguous italicized words could be interpreted
as meaning "we have a policy of being humane to prisoners of war captured during a war, but this is not a
war and, therefore, there is no obligation on our part to be humane"!
99. N.Y. Times, May 9,1967, at IS, col. 1.
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100. 56 Dep't State Bull. 825 (1967).
101. Instructions for the Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field, General Orders
No. 100, Apr. 23, 1863, Art. 75.
102. See note 61 supra.
103. 2 Bull.JAG 299 (1943).
104. Trial of Lt. Gen. Kurt Maelzer, 11 Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 53 (1946) [hereinafter
cited War Crimes Rep.].
105. IMTFEJudgment, supra note 33, at 1092-95 and 1030-31.
106. See text in connection with note 64 supra.
107. As we have seen, in so far as North Vietnam is concerned there are strong arguments for the position
that the entire Convention is applicable and, that at a minimum, Article 3 of the Convention (note 34 supra)
is certainly applicable despite the untenable position to the contrary taken by North Vietnam. It is therefore,
not even necessary to find that this particular humanitarian rule has attained the status of being a part of the
customary law of war in order to find that it is binding on North Vietnam.
108. It has been mentioned that in the parade conducted on July 6, 1966, the prisoners were handcuffed
in pairs. During the World War II commando raid on Dieppe the manacling of German prisoners of war by
Canadian troops was itself challenged by the German Government as a violation of the law of war and resulted
in a series of reprisals and counter-reprisals. For differing versions of this affair see British War Office, The
Law of War on Land (part III of the Manual of Military Law) 53 n.2(a) (1958); Castren, The Present Law of
War and Neutrality 159 (1954); and ICRC Report, supra note 17, at 368-70.
109. See text in connection with note 8 supra.
110. N.Y. Times, Sept. 30,1965, at 1, col. 6 and at 3, col. 3; id. Feb. 12, 1966, at 12, col. 3; id.July 13,
1966, at 1, col. 7 and at 5, col. 1. An ICRC report stated: "The (North Vietnamese] Red Cross and the
authorities of the DRVN have made known to the ICRC that the captured American pilots are treated
humanely, but that they cannot, however, be considered as prisoners of war. The DRVN Government is in
fact of the opinion that the bombing attacks constitute crimes for which these prisoners will have to answer
before the courts and that the Third Geneva Convention (prisoners of war) is consequendy not applicable to
them ...... ICRC, Vietnam, supra note 85, at 403.
111. N.Y. Times, July 15, 1966, at 1, col. 3 and at 3, col. 1; id. July 19 1966, at 3, col. 1; id. July 20,
1966, at 1, col. 8. The bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong had begun inJune, 1966.
112. BetweenJuly 15 and July 25, 1966, the newspapers in the United States carried several stories on
this subject every day. Questions were asked of the President and statements were made which indicated that
any trials, convictions, and executions would be followed in short order by severe retaliatory action by the
United States. Id.July 19, 1966, at3, col. 3; id.July 21, at 14, col. 2.
113. Neutrals who sought to dissuade the North Vietnamese from their proposed course ofaction included
U Thant, the Secretary General of the United Nations (id.July 17,1966, at 8, col. 3), the Pope (id.July 21,
1966, at 1, col. 5), and the ICRC (id.July 23,1966, at 2, col. 6). Americans opposed to the war in Vietnam
who interceded with the North Vietnamese included Norman Thomas, The National Committee for a Sane
Nuclear Policy (id.July 20,1966, at 1, col. 8) and the so-called Senate "doves," spearheaded by Senator Frank
Church ofIdaho (id.July 161966, at 1, col. 1 and at3, col. 2). Many competent observers of the international
scene consider that this latter appeal was probably the most effective on Communist pragmatism.
114. Id.July 24,1966, at 1, col. 1.
115. Id.July 25,1966, at 1, col. 8.
116. Id. July 26, 1966, at 3, col. 2.
117. Supra note 15, Art. 1.
118. Supra note 61, Art. 1.
119. Supra note 4, Art. 4.
120. N.Y. Times, May 9, 1967, at 15, col. 1. This is also the only logical interpretation which can be
placed on the letter of Aug. 31,1965, from the North Vietnamese Government to the ICRC, note 8 supra.
See also the ICRC report quoted in note 110 supra.
121. Article 85 of the Convention reads as follows: "Prisoners of war prosecuted under the laws of the
Detaining Power for acts committed prior to capture shall retain, even if convicted, the benefits of the present
Convention."
122. Matter of Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1,21,22,24 (1946). This position was adopted generally by war
crimes tribunals and national courts after World War II. 4 War Crimes Rep. 78 (1948). At least one noted
Soviet legal writer took the same position, stating: "On account of these inhuman crimes committed by him,
Ritz ceased to be a soldier even before he was seized by units of the Red Army, and consequendy did not
become a war prisoner when he was seized.... " Trainin, Hiderite Responsibility under Criminal Law 88
(1945).
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123. Statement ofRJ. Wilhelm representing the ICRC. Final Record, supra note 13, Vol. lIA, at318-19.
124. The proposed amendment stated: "Prisoners of war convicted of war crimes and crimes against
humanity under the legislation of the Detaining Power, and in conformity with the principles of the
Nuremberg Trial, shall be treated in the same way as persons serving a sentence for a criminal offence in the
territory of the Detaining Power." Id. at 319.
125. Id. at 321. In a statement made to the Plenary Meeting, General Skylarov, another Soviet delegate,
said that under the Soviet proposal prisoners ofwar guilty ofwar crimes or crimes against humanity, "olue their
guilt has been established and they have been senterued by a regular court, " should no longer enjoy the benefits of
the Convention. Id. Vol. 1m, at 303 (emphasis added).
126. Id. Vol. IIA, at 570-71. In supporting the Soviet proposal in the discussion at the Plenary Meeting,
the delegate from Czechoslovakia pointed out that "it concerns those prisoners of war who have been
convicted" (id. Vol. 1m, at 305) and the Bulgarian delegate stated that "it is assumed that sentence has already
been pronounced" and that "we are dealing with war criminals convicted as such." (Id. at 307).
127. Id. at 311. The Soviet proposal was rejected by a vote of8-23-7. The only change made by the
Diplomatic Conference in the Stockholm (working) draft was the substitution of the word "retain" for the
word "enjoy" in the English version.
128. Yingling & Ginnane, supra note 37, at 410; Public Prosecutorv. Oie Hee Koi et al., [1968]2 W.L.R.
715,727.
129. Pictet, Commentary, supra note 30, at 425. Those safeguards are found in Arts. 84-88 and 99-108,
inclusive, of the Convention. After World War II several Japanese commanders were tried and convicted of
being responsible for unfair trials of captured American airmen. Trial oflt. Gen. Shigeru Sawada, 5 War
Crimes Rep. 1 (1948); Trial oflt. Gen. Harukei Isayama, id. at 60; Trial of Gen. Tanaka Hisakasu, id. at 66.
The IMTFE reviewed and condemned, by implication, theJapanese trials and executions ofAmerican airmen.
IMTFEJudgment, supra note 33, at 1024-31. In its "Notes on the Case" dealing with United States v. Alstotter
et al. (The Justice Case), 6 War Crimes Rep. 1, 103 (1948), the United Nations War Crimes Commission
enumerated the requirements for a fair trial, its conclusions being drawn from a number of sources and
representing customary international law.
130. The reservation to Article 85 made by the USSR at the time of signature (75 U.N.T.S. 135, 460)
and maintained at the time ofratification (191 U.N.T.S. 367) states: "The Union ofSoviet Socialist Republics
does not consider itself bound by the obligation, which follows from Article 85, to extend the application of
the Convention to prisoners of war who have been convicted under the law of the Detaining Power, in
accordance with the principles of the Nuremberg trial, for war crimes and crimes against humanity, it being
understood that persons convicted of such crimes must be subject to the conditions obtaining in the countty
in question for those who undergo their punishment." In response to an inquiry concerning the meaning of
the foregoing reservation, the Soviet Foreign Ministty said, in a note dated May 26, 1955, to the Swiss Federal
Council, that: "[Tlhe reservation ... signifies that prisoners of war who, under the laws of the USSR have
been convicted of war crimes or crimes against humanity must be subject to the conditions obtaining in the
USSR for all other persons undergoing punishment in execution ofjudgments by the courts. O,ue the sentmce
has become legally enforceable, persons in this category consequently do not enjoy the protection which the
Convention affords." Pictee, Commentary, supra note 30, at 424 (emphasis added).
131. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, S.
Exec. Rep. No.9, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29 (1955). For some of the factors which caused Senate
perturbation, see Levie, Penal Sanctions for Maltreatment of Prisoners of War, 56 Am. J. Int I l. 433, 443
n.37 (1962).
132. The original adherence, including the reservations, was in the Vietnamese language. It was
accompanied by a French translation. letter to the author from the Swiss Federal Political Department,Jan.
31, 1968. The French translation includes the words "poursuivis et condamnes"-"prosecuted and convicted."
274 U.N.T.S. 340 (emphasis added).
133. It has been suggested, for example, that the "and" in the words "prosecuted for and convicted of'
might have been intended to be read disjunctively. Note, The Geneva Convention and the Treatment of
Prisoners of War in Vietnam, supra note 63, at 862. Under this interpretation it is said that a prisoner of war
could be deprived of the benefits of the Convention by the mere filing of a charge against him alleging a war
crime or a crime against humanity. But "et" is not given a disjunctive intendment in French, and if "et" or
"and" were to be construed disjunctively this would mean that a prisoner of war prosecuted but not convicted
(prosecuted and acquitted) could still be denied the benefits of the Convention because one of the two
alternatives possible under the disjunctive construciton would have been met-he would have been
prosecuted. This obviously does not make sense!
134. The argument might be made that absent the Convention we are relegated to customary international
law-and that this is what the courts applied in Matter of Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, and other similar cases. But
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as we have already seen in so far as North Vietnam is concerned, it is undeniable that the Convention is
applicable (see text in connection with notes 27-33 supra) and, that in any event at a minimum, Article 3 is
applicable (see text in connection with notes 34-45 supra). Para. l(d) of Art. 3 (note 34 supra) specifies the
protections to be accorded persons charged with offenses.
135. See Dep't State Memorandum to the International Committee of the Red Cross, Entitlement of
American Military Personnel Held by North Viet Nam to Treatment as Prisoners of War, etc.,July 13, 1966.
Charges that the use ofnapalm bombs is a violation ofthe law ofwar have also been heard with some frequency.
An Indian scholar has said, in this regard: "[DJuring the Second World War and during the hostilities in Korea
the use offlame-throwers and of napaIm and incendiary bombs appear to have been regarded as legal." Singh,
Nuclear Weapons and International Law 151 (1959). While the question may not be free from doubt, it is
certainly sufficiently controversial to preclude unilateral decision by the North Vietnamese with respect thereto.
136. During the course of the July, 1966, excitement Senator Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut, who had
been a member of the prosecution at Nuremberg, issued a statement in which he pointed out: "No Luftwaffe
pilot, or Luftwaffe commander for example, was brought to trial because ofhis participation in the bombing
of London despite the fact that London bombings were directed primarily at the civilian population.... " 112
Congo Rec. 16,224 (daily ed., July 25,1966).
137. After several years of preparatory drafring by the ICRC, the Draft Rules for the Limitation of the
Dangers Incurred by the Civilian Population in Time of War were published and distributed in 1956 so that
they could be discussed and acted upon at the XIXth International Red Cross Conference in New Delhi in
1957. They were discussed at New Delhi, and they have been the subject of much discussion since then, but
their status as an unofHiciai proposal has not changed.
138. The commentary to Art. 10 states, in part: "It was •.• to prevent target area bombing from being
accepted as a regular practice, or even condoned, that the ICRC felt it desirable to insert the relevant rule in
Article 10 and thus to lay emphasis on the prohibition ofindiscriminate bombing." Id. at 91.
139. One expert in this field takes the rather paradoxical position that target-area bombing was legal during
World War II, and so remains, but that indiscriminate bombing is a violation of the law of air warfare. Spaight,
Air Power and War Rights 271, 272, and 277 (3d ed. 1947).
140. It has been intimated that the North Vietnamese take the position that as the United States is guilty
ofmaking "aggressive war," the airmen are all guilty of crimes against peace. This is the category of war crime
specified in Article 6(a) of the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal, which reads: "Crimes
against peace: Namely, planning, preparation, initiation, or waging a war of aggression, or a war in violation
ofinternational treaties, agreements, or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing." Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression: Opinion and Judgment 3 (1947).
Article 5(a) of the IMTFE differs only in minor respects. IMTFEJudgment, supra note 33, Annex 5-A, at 21.
Apart from the trials of the major Nazi leaders by the IMT and by some of the Nuremberg Military Tribunals
and ofthe majorJapanese leaders by the IMTFE, no one has ever been tried for this war crime which, obviously,
can only be committed by those who have the power to make war, and not by those who do the fighting. In
United States v. von Leeb et al., 10 Trials 1, at 11 Trials 489 (1948), the Military Tribunal said: "Ifand as long
as a member of the armed forces does not participate in the preparation planning, initiaring or waging of
aggressive war on a policy level his war activities do not fall under the definition of Crimes against Peace. It
is not a person's rank or status, but his power to shape or influence the policy ofhis State, which is the relevant
issue for determining his criminality under the charge of Crimes against Peace." This is the real meaning of
the announcement by Ho Chi Minh that no trials ofAmerican airmen were then contemplated, but that Rusk,
McNamara andJobnson were in a different category. See text in connection with note 116 supra.
141. One American sailor, Apprentice Seaman Douglas Hegdabl, who fell overboard from his ship and
some hours later was rescued by North Vietnamese fishermen and made a prisoner of war, is apparently
receiving exactly the same treatment as the alleged war criminals-no mail, no relief packages, no visits by the
ICRC, etc.
142. Levie, supra note 131, at 461-62. A footnote to the last sentence quoted points out that when trials
are postponed until after the cessation of hostilities the deterrent effect of widespread publicity is lost. Id. at
462 n.1l5.
143. See text in connection with notes 47-56 supra. Certainly, the 59 nations which drafted and signed
the Convention and the 117 which have ratified or adhered to it had no qualms about the validity of Article
3. Only Portugal made a reservation to that Article at the time of signing, but its reservation did not question
the validity of Article 3 and was not maintained on ratification.
144. See text in connection with notes 57-70 supra.
145. See text in connection with notes 64-68 supra, and 156-163 infra.
146. N.Y. Times,June 22,1965, at 6, col. 1.
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147. Id. at 1, col. 7. He had been apprehended in Saigon while attaching a fuse to a bomb which was to
have exploded five minutes later.
148. Id.June 25,1965, at 1, col. 6; id.June 26,1965, at 1, col. 8 and at 2, col. 7.
149. 53 Dep't State Bull. 55 (1965). The statement also said that "these Communist threats to intimidate,
of course, will not succeed." Subsequent events have revealed that this portion of the statement was incorrect!
150. N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1965 at 1, col. 1.
151. 53 Dep't State Bull. 635 (1965).
152. ICRC, Viemam, supra note 85, at 411. Despite the American statement concerning no intimidation,
supra note 149, no Vietcong terrorist has been executed since September, 1965, and when three Vietcong
terrorists were convicted and sentenced to be executed on November 17, 1967, they were given a last minute
reprieve by South Viemamese Premier Nguyen Can Loc. N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1967.
153. 2 Lauterpacht's Oppenheim, International Law 561 (7th ed. 1952). An example of a legitimate act
of reprisal is given in United States Army Field Manual 27-10, The Law of Land Warfare 177 (1956), where
it is stated: "For example the employment by a belligerent of a weapon the use ofwhich is normally precluded
by the law of war would constitute a lawful reprisal for intentional mistreatment of prisoners of war held by
the enemy."
154. N.Y. Times,June 22,1965, at 6, col. 1; and id., Sept. 28,1965, at 1, col. 1. It should be borne in
mind that at no time have the Vietcong or the NLF ever contended that the executed Americans had committed
any act warranting execution or that their executions were pursuant to the sentence of a court.
155. N.Y. Times,June 26,1965, at 2, col. 7.
156. Morgan, The German War Book 74 (1915).
157. See, e.g., para. 20 of the Anglo-German Agreement ofJuly 2, 1917 (111 Brit. & For. State Papers
257,263); Art. XXI of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement of Dec. 28,1917 (id. at 557,566); and para. 42 of the
Franco-German Agreement of Apr. 26, 1918 (id. at 713,721).
158. Supra note 61, Article 2. It is repeated in Article 13 of the 1949 Convention.
159. Flory, Prisoners of War 44 (1942).
160. United States v. List et al., 11 Trials 757, 1252-53 (1948). This case is sometimes referred to as The
Southeast Case.
161. United States v. von Leeb et al., 11 Trials 528 (1948) (emphasis added).
162. Notes on The Dreierwalde Case, 1 War Crimes Rep. 86 (1947); Digest of Laws and Cases, 15 War
Crimes Rep. 99 (1949). In the former the statement is made that "the killing of prisoners of war constituted
a war crime under the customary International Law even before the promulgation and ratification of the
Conventions of 1907 [Hague] and 1929 [Geneva]." (Emphasis added).
163. See text in connection with note 64 supra.
164. "According to the existing international law, reprisals against an ally of an enemy-state for acts of the
enemy-state are not permissible as they are not directed against the state responsible for the act. Reprisals,
therefore, may, according to the existing rules of the laws of war, only be employed against the responsible
state." Moritz, The Common Application of the Laws of War Within the NATO-Forces, 13 Mil. L. Rev. 1
Ouly 1961). To the same general effect, see United States v. List et al. (The Hostage Case), 11 Trials 1270
(1948).

